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Abstract
Using a unique dataset of German members of parliament (MPs) this paper
analyzes the politicians’ wage gap (PWG). After controlling for observable
characteristics as well as accounting for election probabilities and campaigning
costs, we find a positive income premium for MPs which is statistically and
economically significant. Our results are consistent with the citizen candidate
model: The PWG amounts to 35–65% when comparing MPs to citizens in an
executive position. However, it shrinks to zero when restricting the control
group to top-level executives. This suggests that German politicians do not
receive excessive pay when compared to senior executives.
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1 Introduction
Do politicians enjoy a wage premium? Previous research has only examined income
differentials between public and private sector employees.1 In this paper, we empir-
ically test whether there is a politicians’ wage gap (PWG) for German members of
parliament (MPs) conditional on qualification as well as election probabilities and
campaigning costs. To the best of our knowledge this has not been investigated
before. This specific wage gap could, however, be very important – especially when
taking into account that an increasing share of the population in Western democra-
cies perceives that the political class has separated itself from the electorate, forming
an elitist circle of substantive political power and little accountability (Hay, 2007).
Moreover, growing economic inequality has amplified the general discontent with
politicians, since the political elite is said to belong to the top of the income distri-
bution, separating it from the average citizen (Gilens, 2005; Solt, 2008).2 However,
from a theoretical point of view, the citizen candidate framework suggests an in-
come premium for politicians as a compensation for the uncertainty of (re)election
as well as for campaigning costs (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate,
1997). Moreover, a wage premium can be justified to attract high quality candidates
(Messner and Polborn, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004).
In the empirical analysis we make use of a unique micro dataset of personal
and professional information on German MPs, providing detailed insight into their
earnings (including office remuneration and outside earnings) as well as their oc-
cupation before entering parliament (Becker et al., 2009). We combine these data
with the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), a micro dataset which is
representative for the German population and thus for the electorate. We estimate
election probabilities as well as campaigning costs for candidates running for the
German parliament in order to calculate MPs’ expected income. The empirical
1 See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1987); Bender (1998); Gregory and Borland (1999) for overviews.
Although most studies concentrate on US data, similar results are obtained for other countries (e.g.
Pederson et al., 1990; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Melly, 2005; Gorodnichenko and Peter, 2007).
2 The German case is of special interest as the reputation of politicians in Germany seems to
be lower than the reputation of most other occupations and has been decreasing for many years
(Allensbacher Archiv, 2008). In addition, trust in German politicians is rather low compared to
several other European countries (European Social Survey, 2007).
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analysis then proceeds in two steps in order to estimate the PWG. First, we employ
a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to account for observable char-
acteristics that affect earnings. Second, we make use of semi-parametric matching
techniques in order to further increase comparability between MPs and voters.
Our results show that both the sign and the size of wage gap depend on the def-
inition of the control group and the MPs’ income. On average politicians earn more
than citizens in executive positions after controlling for observed characteristics,
most importantly qualification. Using a broad definition of executives, the PWG
varies between 35–65% depending on the specification (corresponding to 20,000–
36,000 euros per year). Robustness checks suggest that these results are unlikely
to be biased by positive selection into politics. When defining the control group
more narrowly, the wage gap shrinks and is statistically indistinguishable from zero
for “top-level” executives, suggesting that German politicians pay is not excessive
in this case. These findings are consistent with the citizen candidate framework,
which stipulates a non-negative wage gap. The wage gap mechanically decreases
when excluding politicians’ outside earnings while it increases considerably when
neglecting election probabilities and campaigning costs.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical
concept underlying our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the institutional
background and the data. In Section 4, we lay out our empirical strategy and
present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section we use the citizen candidate framework (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996;
Besley and Coate, 1997) to provide a theoretical explanation for a non-negative
income differential for members of parliament when compared to the electorate.
Initially all citizens find themselves in a situation of political competition and have
to decide whether to run for office (Cadigan, 2005). Citizens weigh the costs of
running for office against the uncertain individual benefits of winning the election.3
3 See Besley (2004); Mattozzi and Merlo (2008); Gersbach (2009); Braendle and Stutzer (2010);
De Paola and Scoppa (2011). For empirical applications see Ferraz and Finan (2009); Gagliarducci
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Typically, the necessary condition for a rational citizen to decide to run for political
office takes the form (Caselli and Morelli, 2004)
p · (W office −W private) ≥ CC. (1)
Hence, the difference between office remuneration (W office) and market income in
the private sector (W private) weighted by the election probability (p) has to com-
pensate for the direct campaigning costs (CC) associated with candidacy. From
expression (1) it follows directly that the pay of politicians should exceed the in-
come of comparable citizen in order to compensate for the uncertainty of (re)election
and for the sunk costs of candidacy.
The model has implications for the selection of candidates with regard to
qualification. The effect of ability on participation is mixed. On the one hand, high-
ability citizens have a higher expected income in the private sector and therefore
face a lower wage premium when running for office. On the other hand, if voters
prefer competent citizens in political office, they are more likely to win the election
and might face lower costs due to more efficient campaigning.
The politicians’ wage gap. The main purpose of this study is to empirically
test whether there is a wage premium for German MPs which can neither be ex-
plained by advantageous characteristics of politicians, such as qualification, nor by a
compensation for uncertainties and campaigning costs stemming from electoral com-
petition. In order to specify what we refer to as the politicians’ wage gap (PWG) we
define a binary indicator Ri, which equals 1 if individual i decides to run for office,
and 0 otherwise. Individual income Yi is defined as
Yi(Xi, pi) =
pi ·W
MP
i (Xi) + (1− pi) ·W citi (Xi)− CCi if Ri = 1
W citi (Xi) if Ri = 0,
(2)
where Xi denotes individual characteristics and pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of being
elected. When running for office, income is the probability weighted sum of office
et al. (2010); Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2011).
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remuneration WMPi and potential income in the private labor market W
cit
i net of
campaigning costs CCi. When not running for office, income simply yields the
market income of a citizen given the characteristics Y citi . Comparing the incomes
of two individuals i (a candidate) and j (a citizen) with identical characteristics
Xi = Xj = X˜ yields a definition of the relative wage gap:
PWG unc
(
X˜, pi
)
= pi ·
(
WMP (X˜)
W cit(X˜)
− 1
)
− CCi
W cit(X˜)
(3)
Expression (3) defines the unconditional PWG, taking into account the uncertainty
of candidate i being (re)elected as well as the requirement to invest in the election
campaign.4 From the perspective of the citizen candidate framework, the uncon-
ditional PWG of an elected MP should in general be weakly greater than zero
assuming that candidates form realistic expectations regarding election probabili-
ties and campaigning costs, otherwise they should not have decided to run for office.
Alternatively, a positive wage premium for politicians could be interpreted as a prize
for winning the political tournament.
3 Institutional Background and Data
The Bundestag is the lower house of the German parliament and is elected for a four-
year term. Each eligible voter has two votes. The first one is directly attributed
to a candidate representing the electoral district. This part of the election has
features of the majority voting system. The second vote is for a party which may
then, according to its share of party votes, send candidates from predefined electoral
lists into the Bundestag. This part of the election has the feature of proportional
representation. While each directly elected candidate represents one of the 299
electoral districts, candidates on the party lists capture the remaining 299 seats in
accordance with their party’s overall share of second votes. Due to 16 additional
surplus mandates, the Bundestag comprised a total number of 614 seats in its 16th
4 We also estimate the conditional wage gap, defined as PWG cond(X˜) = W
MP ( eX)
W cit( eX) − 1. It
neglects election probabilities and campaigning costs and is nested in (3). This wage gap is observed
by the electorate and thus relevant for the perception of the political elite’s pay.
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legislative period (Oct 2005–Sept 2009).
Data. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset comprising personal
and professional information on German MPs, which is an extended and updated
version of the data used by Becker et al. (2009). We only include MPs who have
been members of the Bundestag for the entire period under consideration. Hence, a
total of 599 MPs are considered for the year 2006. We extract all available data in-
cluding biographical and socio-demographic information as well as data on previous
occupations and political offices from the MPs’ individual Bundestag websites.
We calculate the annual gross earnings as the sum of basic office remuneration,
payments for cabinet members, pensions, interim allowances and outside earnings.
Each MP receives a remuneration which is determined by the Bundestag itself (7,009
euros per month in 2006, Bundestag, 2009). Furthermore, MPs who are both mem-
bers of the Bundestag and the Federal Government are paid extra. When a member
of the government resigns, she receives interim payments for the number of months
she has served as a member of the cabinet – a total of at least six months but not
more than three years (Bundesministergesetz, 2008). After resigning from office the
former minister is entitled to a pension if the position was held for at least two years.
Since 2005 MPs have been legally obliged to disclose information on outside
employment (Bundestag, 2010). All MPs have to report professional activities and
sources of income, which they pursue outside their political mandate. For each
payment it is indicated whether it is received on a regular (annual or monthly) basis
or one-off (Bundestag, 2011b). Outside earnings are published according to four
categories: (1) below 1,000 euros, (2) 1,000–3,500 euros, (3) 3,500–7,000 euros and
(4) more than 7,000 euros. The highest category has no upper bound. In order to
obtain a measure of outside earnings in the highest category, we follow Becker et al.
(2009) and assume a level of 12, 000 euros, giving us a linearly increasing difference
between the category means.5 Finally, we calculate the amount of outside earnings
5 As this choice may induce distortions, we experiment with several alternatives – including the
categories’ lower bounds. The results do not change qualitatively. In terms of quantitative effects,
note that the chosen upper bound level is a conservative assumption (Becker et al., 2009). Hence,
if estimated effects are biased they will be underestimated. We check the information on outside
earnings with other data sources such as newspaper reports and MPs’ personal statements.
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for each MP by using average values for each category.
All earnings are before taxes and are likely to underestimate an MP’s total
income. First, we do not include capital income due to the lack of data. Second,
we do not consider the (partly tax-free) allowances for office related expenses as
they are not necessarily part of the individual earnings. Third, we do not include
additional incomes paid to (vice-)chairmen of the parties’ parliamentary groups as
this information is not publicly available for all parties and MPs.6
We combine the politicians’ data with representative survey data for the elec-
torate taken from the SOEP (Wagner et al., 2007) and construct the same socio-
demographic variables for the electorate in 2006. Total gross earnings are calculated
at the individual level by accumulating labor earnings, fringe benefits, pensions
and replacement allowances. Education is based on the CASMIN classification, the
sector of employment on the ISCO-88 classification. Non-Germans as well as indi-
viduals younger than 18 years are excluded since they are not allowed to vote. Note
that in many datasets, high incomes are not very well covered. To tackle this issue,
the SOEP includes a special high income sample to increase the representativeness
of the upper tail of the income distribution, which has been validated against ad-
ministrative data (Frick et al., 2007; Bach et al., 2009). Therefore, the SOEP is the
main data source for the German government’s reports on poverty and aﬄuence.
We use SOEP’s population weights to make the data representative.
Samples. MPs in the German Bundestag have climbed the job ladder within the
profession of a politician. They have personnel responsibility, which certainly dis-
tinguishes them from the average employee. Moreover, they face a relatively high
workload. For these reasons we consider MPs to hold an executive position in terms
of occupation and only compare them to citizens working in an executive position
as well. To check the sensitivity with respect to the control group, we start with a
rather broad definition of the executive sample. We then narrow down the defini-
tion in two steps, by excluding certain professions from the baseline. Our broadest
6 Office-related allowances mainly cover expenses at the constituency (about 3,700 euros per
month), staff costs (more than 14,000 euros) and travel costs. Party salaries can be quite substan-
tial. For example, a vice-chairman of the SPD receives 3,451 euros per month.
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sample follows the SOEP definition and includes individuals in leadership positions
across various occupational sectors working full-time. This sample comprises mas-
ter craftsmen, self-employed, liberal professions, managers as well as public sector
executives and high-level civil servants. We refer to this sample as “all executives”.
The second reference group (“white collar executives”) excludes master craftsmen as
well as self-employed and liberal professionals without employees from the baseline.
Finally, we define the “top-level executive” sample as managers as well as liberal
professionals and self-employed with ten or more employees.
Table 1: Characteristics of the German electorate and the MPs (in %) in 2006
Electorate All executives White collar Top level MPs
Gender Female 52.2 22.1 19.9 16.9 32.2
Age 18 – 29 16.7 4.9 4.3 4.8 1.2
30 – 39 15.0 21.0 21.8 20.7 12.5
40 – 49 20.1 35.9 35.3 39.6 24.2
50 – 59 16.2 27.1 26.1 23.8 41.4
60 – 69 15.3 9.9 10.8 7.3 19.9
≥ 70 16.8 1.2 1.7 3.7 0.8
Education Low-skilled 15.4 2.3 1.2 0.0 0.2
Medium-skilled 68.0 56.5 47.1 48.0 17.0
High-skilled 16.6 41.2 51.6 52.0 82.8
Region West Germany 77.4 77.5 83.4 87.3 78.0
Occupational status Not working 47.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Part-time 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Full-time 38.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sector Private sector 36.2 18.2 20.0 68.3 40.1
Public sector 8.3 15.1 24.7 3.7 53.4
Self-employed 5.6 66.7 55.3 28.0 6.5
Annual earnings Mean 28,135 56,110 70,036 88,536 105,698
(in euros) Median 24,000 42,000 55,059 72,000 86,108
Observations 20,836 1,505 985 299 599
Source: SOEP and Bundestag, own calculations.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of characteristics
among the German population eligible to vote as well as among our three exec-
utive samples and the MPs. Despite efforts to increase the number of women in
professional leadership positions, female politicians are clearly under-represented in
the Bundestag. The share of females is even smaller among executives (17–22%).
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Both executives and MPs turn out to be older and much better educated than the
electorate. More than 40% of the executives are classified as high-skilled and the pro-
portion among MPs is even twice as large. Furthermore, members of the Bundestag
often exhibit an occupational background in the public sector while many executives
are self-employed. Regarding our research question we are especially interested in
the comparability of MPs and executives in terms of annual gross earnings. With
a median of 24,000 euros (in 2006), the center of the electorate’s distribution is far
below the center of the “all executives” and the MPs’ distributions which exhibit
median values of 42,000 and 86,100 euros. MP earnings average at 106,000 euros,
while the mean among the electorate is 28,100 euros and 56,100 euros in the “all
executive” sample. Comparing the three executive samples, the narrowing of the
definition becomes apparent in the rising mean and median earnings.
Election probabilities. Due to its mixed-member electoral system (see above)
there are two channels to enter the Bundestag, either by winning the majority of
votes in an electoral district or by being ranked sufficiently high on a party list. We
quantify the probabilities of being elected for both channels separately. We first
turn to the probability of being elected directly in one of the 299 electoral districts.
For decades, districts have only been won by candidates from the two major
parties with Christian (Social) democrats being more successful in the South and
West (North and East) as well as in rural and catholic (urban and protestant) areas.7
Hence, the party’s share of first votes in the previous election (2002) can be regarded
as a meaningful predictor for the 2005 vote share and implicitly the probability of
winning the majority in the district. In fact, the data show that an individual
candidate can influence the electoral outcome only marginally (e.g. by popularity
or campaigning effort). To quantify the probability, we retrieve the 2002 first vote
shares for each party in each of the 299 districts. We then run a logistic regression
of the binary outcome variable elected (= 1 if candidate is elected, 0 otherwise) on
party and state dummy variables and on the 2002 first vote share.8 We use the
7 An exception are three districts in the East of Berlin where the Left Party’s candidates received
the majority of first votes several times. In 2005, a candidate running for the Green Party was
successful in another Berlin district for the first time.
8 The predicted probabilities for the major parties’ candidates are displayed in Figure A.1 in
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predicted values for the MPs in our dataset.
The election of party list candidates works as follows: In each of the 16 German
states every party sets up a separate list (Landesliste). The total share of second
votes determines a party’s total number of seats in parliament. After subtracting
each party’s number of directly elected MPs, the remaining total is then allocated to
the state party lists (net of the direct candidates) according to the share of second
votes in the respective state. This number finally determines how many party list
candidates enter parliament. Consequentially, a candidate’s election probability on
a party list is a function of the rank and the number of seats allocated to the party.
To estimate these probabilities, we construct a dataset of all party list candidates
running for the 2005 election of the Bundestag based on information from the federal
agency administrating elections (Bundeswahlleiter, 2011). We run a logistic regres-
sion of the binary outcome elected on a set of explanatory variables. These comprise
state and party dummies, the rank on the respective party list, a binary indicator for
the traditional “major parties” (the Christian democrats, the Social democrats and
the Left Party in the Eastern states) as well as several interaction terms. Moreover,
we include a binary variable indicating whether the party list rank is “promising”,
i.e. if it had allowed to enter parliament in the previous election. Based on the esti-
mated coefficients, we use the predicted values for the elected MPs in our dataset.9
The overall probability of being elected is the maximum of the probabilities of being
elected either through a party list or directly in an electoral district. In Table 2 we
present the estimated probabilities for all candidates and elected MPs.
Campaigning costs. Campaigning costs can be regarded as a necessary invest-
ment to be made before being (re)elected and hence reduce an MP’s income. The
amount of campaigning costs can be expected to vary across MPs depending on
the Appendix. Note that there are two distinct curves with similar shapes for both major parties.
The one more to the left (with less observations) represents Eastern German districts where the
Left Party receives a much larger share of votes than in the West and the probability of winning
the relative majority is higher for a given vote share.
9 See Figure A.2 in the Appendix. In some cases (especially for Christian and Social democrats)
predicted probabilities are rather low even for high-ranked candidates. This is due to the fact that
in some federal states one of the major parties regularly wins almost every district (first vote) such
that the respective party cannot send any list candidate to parliament.
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Table 2: Estimated election probabilities
Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
Party list
All candidates 1,843 0.208 0.360 0.000 1.000
Elected MPs 384 0.828 0.242 0.001 1.000
Elected MPs (major parties) 249 0.781 0.260 0.001 1.000
Electoral district
All candidates 1,196 0.250 0.397 0.000 1.000
Elected MPs 299 0.880 0.226 0.021 1.000
Elected MPs (major parties) 295 0.881 0.225 0.021 1.000
Overall
Christian democrat 216 0.861 0.216 0.032 1.000
Social democrat 221 0.863 0.217 0.107 1.000
Green Party 46 0.939 0.128 0.340 1.000
Liberal Party 61 0.918 0.173 0.380 1.000
Left Party 53 0.850 0.287 0.001 1.000
None 2 0.964 0.001 0.963 0.965
Elected MPs 599 0.873 0.215 0.001 1.000
Source: Bundeswahlleiter (2011), own calculations.
various individual characteristics. Unfortunately, detailed information regarding
campaigning expenses from the politicians under consideration is not available.10
The only reliable source of information on campaigning expenses are the parties’
annual statements of accounts (Bundestag, 2011a). In Germany, political parties
are legally obliged to report their financial situation to the President of the Bun-
destag on an annual basis and separately for each federal state. We collect data on
the parties’ expenses from the statements of accounts during the period 2004–2009.
We subtract revenues (i.e. party donations and government subsidies) to calculate
yearly net expenses by party and state. As in some states the Bundestag elections
coincide with other elections, we need to net out the effect of those other elections on
expenses. We, therefore, run a state-party fixed effect regression of net expenses on
10 There are only very few MPs who provide information on individual campaigning costs
(see for instance Martin Do¨rmann reporting personal expenses of 10,000 euros, http://
www.martin-doermann.de/live/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/glaeserne-taschen.pdf, 10–
19–2011). Moreover, neither party headquarters nor parliamentary groups were willing or able
to provide detailed information upon request.
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federal, state, district and European election year dummies and predict the expenses
for the year 2005 as if there had not been any other elections.11 Thus, we obtain the
net expenses per electoral seat for the Bundestag election 2005 by state and party.
We define these as campaigning costs that the individual candidates have to bear.
Table 3: Estimated campaigning costs per seat by state and party (in euros)
Party
State Christ. dem. Social dem. Green Liberal Left Total
BB 22,333 61,295 9,804 19,578 24,888 27,580
BE 21,892 35,157 12,333 22,542 25,420 23,469
BW 18,215 36,351 11,080 19,239 22,983 21,573
BY -13,153 30,121 10,424 19,564 22,411 13,873
HB 52,756 21,886 692 18,950 23,898 23,636
HE 20,329 38,659 11,682 16,131 24,161 22,192
HH -13,632 49,603 6,561 16,172 21,189 15,978
MV 15,811 36,783 10,364 18,368 23,014 20,868
NS 23,474 36,094 11,042 18,819 22,695 22,425
NW 36,787 49,789 14,411 23,443 22,848 29,455
RP 30,589 41,588 11,326 21,176 23,122 25,560
SA 21,487 35,899 12,881 17,898 21,674 21,968
SH 24,878 39,474 14,203 19,181 28,754 25,298
SL 14,302 40,092 9,647 19,144 23,170 21,271
SN 73,567 58,198 13,005 11,399 34,079 38,050
TH 19,764 40,900 12,787 17,925 25,850 23,445
Total 23,087 40,743 10,765 18,721 24,385 23,540
Source: Bundestag (2011a), own calculations.
The results are displayed in Table 3. On average, campaigning costs amount to
23,500 euros per seat and there is considerable variation not only across parties but
also across states. Interestingly, looking at the two major parties, the campaigning
costs for Social democrats are on average much higher than for Christian democrats
(41,000 vs. 23,000 euros) which is due to a considerably higher amount of donations
for the latter. Note that the negative values in Table 3 indicate that revenues,
especially from donations, exceeded expenses. In those cases, we set the individual
11 Regression outputs are available from the authors upon request.
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campaigning costs of the candidate to zero. The estimated campaigning costs can
be regarded as an upper bound from the individual candidate’s perspective since
it is highly unlikely that the candidate has to personally bear the whole additional
costs. Usually, candidates receive (financial) support from their local party as well.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Ordinary Least Squares
The model. In order to estimate the politicians’ wage gap as defined in Section
2, we define an indicator variable Pi, which takes on the value 1 if individual i is an
MP and 0 otherwise. Annual earnings Yi for MPs and citizens are defined as follows:
Yi =
p̂i ·W
MP
i + (1− p̂i) · Ŵi − ĈCi if Pi = 1
W citi if Pi = 0
(4)
For the citizens we use the information on gross earnings W citi from the SOEP.
For the MPs we use the collected information on earnings WMPi multiplied with the
estimated election probabilities p̂i. Potential earnings of an MP in the private sector
Ŵi are predicted values based on estimated coefficients from an OLS regression on
the sample of citizens. Campaigning costs ĈCi are calculated as described above.
In order to operationalize equation (4), we employ a dummy variable approach
which is standard for detecting wage differentials between subgroups in empirical
labor economics (see e.g. Pederson et al., 1990; Kunze, 2005). As it is common,
instead of estimating the model in levels, we use the log of Yi, which gives the
following Mincerian earnings equation (Mincer, 1974) to be estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS):
ln(Yi) = β0 + β1Pi + βXi + µi. (5)
A positive and significant estimate of β1 would provide empirical evidence in favor of
a wage premium for politicians. Put another way, the coefficient on the politicians’
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dummy corresponds exactly to PWG unc(X˜, pi) from equation (3). In terms of the
citizen candidate model β̂1 measures by how much p·(W office−W private) exceeds CC
(cf. (1)). We control for a vector Xi of demographic characteristics which have been
shown to be standard determinants of earnings, such as gender, qualification, age,
tenure or number of children. The error term is denoted by µi. Depending on the
specification of the model, we also include interaction terms of certain characteristics
with the politician dummy in order to test for heterogeneous effects.
OLS results. Table 4 presents estimation results of equation (5) for the three
different executive samples defined above.12 Specification (1) shows a positive and
highly significant coefficient on the dummy variable politician of 0.501. This suggests
that MPs ceteris paribus earn 65% more than non-MP citizens.13 The coefficients
on the covariates have the expected signs: tenure and age, measuring specific and
general human capital respectively, have a positive but decreasing effect on earnings.
Education has a positive effect on annual earnings. Compared to the low-skilled,
high-skilled (medium-skilled) individuals have a positive income differential of 149%
(57%). The female dummy reveals the well-known gender wage gap (Oaxaca, 1973)
– in our case of around 30%, which is comparable to previous estimates for Germany
(Kunze, 2005; Arulampalam et al., 2007). The variables concerning party affiliation
confirm that supporters of those parties which are said to promote more business
friendly policies – Christian democrats (CDU/CSU) and Liberals (FDP) – earn
about 20–30% more than supporters of Leftist parties.14 Living in East Germany
reduces annual gross individual earnings considerably. Finally, private sector em-
ployees have higher earnings than individuals in the public sector or self-employed.
In specification (2) we restrict the income of MPs to the basic office remuner-
ation. The PWG decreases mechanically to 0.324 (38%), but remains statistically
and economically significantly. In models (3)–(6) we compare the MPs to more
12 In this section we focus on the results when applying the unconditional income concepts for
MPs following definition (3). We also estimate the conditional wage gap. As expected estimates
shift upwards (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).
13 Note that β̂1 can only be interpreted in percentage terms for small values. From (5) it follows
that ln(Y |P = 1)− ln(Y |P = 0) = β1 and thus Y |P=1−Y |P=0Y |P=0 = exp(β1)− 1.
14 Note that survey respondents in the SOEP report their party preferences. Hence we are able
to use information on party affiliation not only for MPs but also for the citizens in our sample.
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Table 4: OLS – Baseline results: Unconditional wage gap
Executive sample All White collar Top-level
MP income Total Remun. only Total Remun. only Total Remun. only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politician 0.501∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.127
(0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.158) (0.158)
Tenure 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.050∗ 0.050∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.034)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled 0.453 0.453 0.255∗ 0.255∗ 0.145 0.144
(0.314) (0.314) (0.144) (0.144) (0.153) (0.153)
High-skilled 0.914∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.308) (0.151) (0.151) (0.164) (0.164)
Female -0.284∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056) (0.082) (0.082)
Married 0.012 0.012 0.067 0.067 0.089 0.090
(0.058) (0.058) (0.063) (0.063) (0.086) (0.086)
Children 0.087 0.087 -0.014 -0.014 0.203∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.091) (0.091)
Christ. dem. 0.191∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.077) (0.077)
Liberal 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.124 0.124 0.332∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.105) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113)
East -0.397∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.063) (0.063) (0.100) (0.100)
Self-employed -0.234∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.097 0.097
(0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.093) (0.093)
Public sector -0.241∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.055
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.111) (0.111)
Constant 8.763∗∗∗ 8.763∗∗∗ 8.794∗∗∗ 8.793∗∗∗ 10.089∗∗∗ 10.088∗∗∗
(0.893) (0.893) (0.508) (0.508) (0.769) (0.769)
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.331 0.376 0.376 0.436 0.436
Observations 2104 2104 1584 1584 898 898
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and
0.01 (***).
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narrowly defined executive samples. As expected the estimated wage gap shrinks.
When applying the “white collar” sample, the wage gap for total income is 0.428
(53%), while the coefficients on the covariates hardly change. Using the “top-level
executives”, the coefficients for both income definitions are not significantly different
from zero. This results is still in line with the citizen candidate framework, which
stipulates a non-negative wage gap.
Group-specific results. The results for the PWG in Table 4 represent an average
effect for all MPs under consideration. To provide further evidence of whether the
wage gap differs for politicians from different socio-demographic backgrounds, we
include interaction terms of the politicians’ -dummy with other characteristics. We
estimate the specifications on the “all executive” sample and include all covariates
used in Table 4 (for total MP income).
The results displayed in Table 5 suggest that we do not find additional returns
to tenure. Specification (2) shows that the wage gap for high-skilled politicians is
much lower (0.815−0.381 = 0.434) than for medium-skilled MPs (0.815), represent-
ing the omitted category. As far as gender is concerned, Table 5 shows a positive and
significant coefficient on the Pol. x Female interaction term. This positive coefficient
neutralizes the negative gender pay gap found in the whole sample (cf. Table 4) so
that women in politics do not earn significantly less then male politicians. This is
not surprising since male and female MPs receive the same basic office remunera-
tion.15 A similar logic applies to the PWG of East German politicians. While the
baseline results in Table 4 show that earnings in the East are much lower for the
combined MP-citizen sample, the Pol. x East interaction term yields a positive sign.
This indicates that the East-West pay gap is significantly smaller among politicians.
Interestingly, as far as party affiliation is concerned, the results of specification
(5) suggest that members of more leftist parties (Social democrats, Green Party,
Left Party) exhibit a substantially higher wage gap conditional on observable char-
acteristics than members of right-wing parties. More precisely, the wage premium
15 This might help to explain why Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) find that increasing office
remuneration has stronger effects for female than for male candidates in Finland. Similarly, running
the earnings regression on the MP sample yields an insignificant gender dummy estimate.
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for liberal and Christian-democratic MPs decreases to 0.289 and 0.354 respectively
compared to 0.641 for leftist MPs. This is due to the fact that left-wing voters earn
less on average (see Table 4).16 Hence, the wage gap is larger when comparing the
incomes of an average left-wing MP and of a comparable left-wing voter. Finally, the
PWG is not different for MPs who have been self-employed before becoming politi-
cian but higher for MPs who have previously worked in the public sector (33%). In
specification (7) we control for all interaction terms simultaneously and results do
not change considerably. As a result, the group-specific results suggest that existing
income differentials between socio-economic groups (male vs. female, West vs. East,
left vs. right) in the overall population are mitigated or even neutralized in the
politicians sample. The earnings distribution among MPs seems to be much more
homogenous than in the private labor market.
Selection on unobservables. Like all empirical studies our analysis is subject to
the well-known danger of omitted variable bias. If there is an unobserved confounder
that affects both the selection into politics and earnings, the estimates of our wage
gap are biased. In the context of our study, such an observed confounder could
be related to the politicians’ personality. For instance, it might be that politicians
have certain qualities, such as higher motivation, more competitiveness or better
networking skills, that make them more likely to become a politician and at the
same time have a positive effect on their earnings.
In order to assess the potential impact of such a positive selection, we make
use of the 2005 wave of the SOEP, which contains information on the Big Five
personality traits of respondents.17 The Big Five is a theoretical measurement sys-
tem stemming from psychology which has been identified to describe an individual’s
personality comprehensively along the five dimensions openness, conscientiousness,
16 Especially the Social democrats as well as the Left Party are traditionally supported by
blue-collar workers. That is why there are close ties between these left-wing parties and trade
unions. In addition, the right-wing parties in Germany are traditionally more business-friendly
which might explain why they receive around 70% of total party donations (Bundestag, 2011a).
These patterns can be expected to have an effect on MPs’ earnings after retiring from politics
(Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009; Querubin and Snyder, 2009).
17 Previous research has shown that the Big Five are stable over time (Cobb-Clark and Schurer,
2011), hence we can use the panel structure of the data and link the personality information from
2005 to our 2006 data
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Table 5: OLS – Interaction effects: Unconditional wage gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Politician 0.514∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.107) (0.090) (0.087) (0.093) (0.082) (0.099)
Pol. x Tenure -0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Pol. x H-skill -0.381∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.070)
Pol. x L-skill 0.470 0.482
(0.326) (0.316)
Pol. x Female 0.336∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.063)
Pol. x East 0.238∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067)
Pol. x Liberal -0.352∗∗∗ -0.160
(0.101) (0.108)
Pol. x Christ. dem. -0.287∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗
(0.065) (0.064)
Pol. x Self-empl. 0.091 0.047
(0.085) (0.072)
Pol. x Public sector 0.282∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.079) (0.079)
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.328
Observations 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104
Notes: Regressions estimated on sample of all executives. MP income is defined as total
earnings. In addition to the interaction terms, all covariates from Table 4 are included in
each specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are 0.1 (*),
0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Previous research has shown that neu-
roticism and (to some extent) agreeableness have a negative effect on earnings and
job performance (see e.g. Nyhus and Pons (2005) and Borghans et al. (2008) for
surveys). We are able to replicate this relationship with our “all executive” sample.
As we do not have any information about the personality traits of MPs, we
need to impute their Big Five values. In order to provide an upper bound for a
positive selection into politics based on personal characteristics, we assume that
MPs have average scores (compared to executives) on the dimensions that do not
affect earnings (i.e. openness, conscientiousness and extraversion). For agreeableness
and neuroticism we, however, assign them values that are one standard deviation
lower than the average, which will have a positive effect on their earnings.
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Table 6: OLS: Unconditional wage gap including Big Five
Executive sample All White collar Top-level
MP income Total Remun. only Total Remun. only Total Remun. only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politician 0.380∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.154 -0.330
(0.100) (0.100) (0.116) (0.115) (0.202) (0.202)
Openness -0.028 -0.028 0.010 0.010 -0.006 -0.006
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.043) (0.043)
Conscientiousness 0.011 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 0.021 0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041)
Extraversion 0.037 0.037 0.014 0.014 0.054 0.054
(0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.039)
Agreeableness -0.046 -0.046 -0.013 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037)
Neuroticism -0.034∗ -0.034∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.048 -0.048
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.354 0.404 0.404 0.469 0.469
Observations 1894 1894 1451 1451 860 860
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In addition to Big Five, all covariates from
Table 4 are included in each specification. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and
0.01 (***).
The suggested selection certainly overestimates the selection effects based on
personality traits. The scarce research on the Big Five in the political arena suggests
that politicians are more extraverted and more agreeable than the average citizen
(Caprara et al., 2003; Gerber et al., 2011). If any, these results would suggest a
negative selection into politics (in terms of income) due to the negative effect of
agreeableness on earnings. The overestimation becomes apparent when looking at
the mean values for agreeableness and openness across samples. While the averages
in the electorate are 5.40 and 3.88 respectively, the average in the “all” (“top-level”)
executive sample are 5.26 and 3.70 (5.25 and 3.53). In contrast, the imputation
method assigns politicians values of 4.38 and 2.43, which are considerably lower.
Table 6 shows that even if the selection based on personal traits into a polit-
ical career is completely positive (with respect to earnings) our estimates are quite
robust. As expected, all coefficients decline, but the PWG remains positive for
specification (1)–(3) and statistically indistinguishable from zero otherwise.18
18 Based on (Caprara et al., 2003)’s finding we also assign politicians an above average level of
extraversion as a robustness check. Results do not change as extraversion does not significantly
18
4.2 Matching
The model. As Table 1 shows, the MPs differ from the executives in several char-
acteristics. The matching technology, an econometric method popular in the field
of labor economics (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), is a method to further increase
the comparability of politicians and executives. In general, matching is applicable
if the population under consideration can be divided into one sub-population re-
ceiving a treatment (in our case being a politician) and another sub-population of
untreated individuals (citizens). Matching is a way to tackle the problem that we
cannot observe what politicians would have earned if they had not been elected by
finding the most appropriate match in terms of observable characteristics within
the control group to calculate the counterfactual outcome. Hence, matching ensures
that only the nearest neighbors in terms of characteristics are used to estimate the
PWG (Imbens, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).19 Furthermore, the matching
framework allows us to assess the relevance of potential unobserved factors influ-
encing the PWG. As discussed in section 4.1, this might be especially important as
unobserved motivation or assertiveness could explain parts of the PWG.
We define a binary “treatment” indicator Pi ∈ {0, 1} that takes the value 1
if an individual is an MP and 0 otherwise. Again, the outcome variable Yi(Pi) is
annual gross earnings. We are interested in estimating the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT), which is defined as
τATT = E[Y (1)|P = 1]− E[Y (0)|P = 1] (6)
with E[.] standing for expectation. The ATT is equal to the potential income dif-
ferential if it was possible to draw an individual i randomly from the sample of MPs
and allow the simultaneous pursuit of a career as a non-MP citizen in the regular
labor market. In order to construct the counterfactual E[Y (0)|P = 1], we identify a
“statistical twin” among the non-treated in terms of observable characteristics. As
affect earnings.
19 In that sense, matching is comparable to non-parametric regression methods such as kernel
estimation since it allows identification without explicit assumptions regarding the (potentially
non-linear) functional form of the association between dependent variables and explanatory factors.
19
matching on numerous characteristics X causes dimensionality problems, we follow
standard practice and condition on the propensity score of being treated. That
is, we estimate the probability of being a politician given X, Pr(P = 1|X), with
a standard probit model.20 The covariates X describe the self-selection into the
treatment, which in case of becoming a politician is certainly a very specific and
individual decision (Gregory and Borland, 1999; Belman and Heywood, 1989).
Matching results. We estimate the propensity score of being a politician using
a simple probit model controlling for all the socio-demographic variables available
in our data, such as age, tenure, qualification, gender, presence of children, marital
status, occupational position (for politicians before becoming MPs) and region.21
As done in Section 4.2 we estimate the PWG using three different definitions
of the control group. Table 7 presents the results of the propensity score matching
with the logarithmized annual earnings as the outcome variable. We employ a one-
to-one nearest neighbor matching specification with replacement and a caliper of one
quarter of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1985). The ÂTT for full earnings and the “all executive” sample is highly
significant and estimated at 0.312, which indicates that being a politician on average
increases earnings by more than 35%. The t-statistics at the lower part of Table 7
show that matching on the propensity score balances treatment and control group
well. The only exception is the East covariate, for which we, nevertheless, do not find
big differences between treatment and control group. Also, the mean standardized
bias after matching of 2.20 is very low and suggests that matching was successful
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The ÂTT remains positive and significant, when
using basic office remuneration as the outcome variable for politicians – excluding
outside earnings, payments for cabinet members, pensions and interim allowances.
Specifications (2) and (3) of Table 7 show that narrowing the control group
20 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that propensity score matching ensures independence
of treatment from the potential outcome, which is one of the two identifying assumptions of the
matching estimator – the other one being the common support assumption.
21 Note that the interpretation of the coefficients of the propensity score estimation is not
economically relevant. Neither is the purpose of propensity score estimation to predict the selection
into treatment, but to balance the covariates. For completeness, estimation results of the probit
estimations are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
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Table 7: Matching: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
Executive Sample All White collar Top-level
Treated observations 599 599 599
Control observations 1,505 985 299
Full earnings
ATT 0.312 (0.061)*** 0.221 (0.090)*** -0.270 (0.534)
Rosenbaum Γ 2.4 1.8 −
Basic office remuneration
ATT 0.135 (0.060)** 0.045 (0.089) -0.447 (0.534)
Rosenbaum Γ 1.6 − −
t-statistics / % bias reduction:
Age -0.03 / 99.5 0.20 / 96.3 6.93 / 12.5
High-skilled -0.39 / 97.5 -4.03 / 67.2 -1.68 / 85.4
Medium-skilled 0.31 / 97.9 3.95 / 66.9 1.60 / 86.0
Children -0.37 / 96.8 -0.49 / 95.5 1.44 / 84.7
Gender 0.12 / 96.5 0.37 / 91.5 0.06 / 99.1
East 1.96 / -103.4 0.00 / 100.0 -0.35 / 86.8
Married 0.06 / 91.1 0.56 / 75.3 -0.51 / 54.9
Public sector -0.06 / 99.5 0.81 / 91.6 -0.12/ 99.3
Self-employed 1.12 / 97.3 2.09 / 94.3 -0.00 / 100.0
Standardized Bias 2.20 5.70 6.58
Note: Estimates are based on “psmatch2” by Leuven and Sianesi (2010) and “rbounds” by
Gangl (2004). One-to-one nearest neighbor matching conducted with replacement and a
caliper of 0.25 ·σprop.score. ATT refers to average treatment effect on the treated. Standard
errors of ATT (shown in parentheses) are corrected following Abadie and Imbens (2006).
Stars indicate the conventional significance levels. Rosenbaum Γ denotes the minimum in-
fluence (in terms of explanatory power of all observables) a potential unobserved confounder
must have to render the PWG estimate insignificant (based on a 1% significance level).
t-statistics with H0 “no significant differences in mean characteristic between treated and
control group”, % bias reduction corresponds to reduced differences in observables between
control and treatment due to matching.
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leads to a decline of the estimated PWG. While it remains positive and significant
for full earnings and the “white collar” sample, it is statistically indistinguishable
from zero in all other earning-sample combinations – a result similar to section 4.1.
As the sample size decreases, it becomes more difficult to balance the covariates and
the mean standard biased rises as a consequence.22
Furthermore, we conduct several robustness checks to make sure that our re-
sults are not driven by functional forms, the matching algorithm or choices made
when estimating the propensity score. We find almost identical estimates when us-
ing Epanechnikov kernel matching. The results are also robust to using a simpler
model to estimate the propensity score excluding all interaction terms. Yet, in that
case, the balancing property is not fulfilled for all covariates, which is precisely the
reason why interaction terms should be used. Moreover, our results do not change
when using a logit instead of a probit model to estimate the propensity score.
Selection on unobservables. Just as in the OLS analysis we are faced with
potential bias caused by omitted variables. So far we have assumed that the observ-
able covariates X fully account for the self-selection of individuals into treatment
and control group. However, if there are unobserved factors that simultaneously
affect selection into treatment and the outcome, the identifying assumption of un-
confoundedness is violated and matching estimators are susceptible to a hidden bias
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In the case of politicians, unobserved characteristics
such as motivation, competitiveness or networking skills, might determine selection
into treatment, while simultaneously having a positive effect on earnings. To ac-
count for this potential bias, we conduct a Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis
(see Rosenbaum (2002) for a technical presentation).23 In a nutshell, the Rosen-
baum bound analysis provides a value Γ, which indicates how sensitive the results
22 As done for OLS we also provide matching estimators for PWG based on the conditional
income of the politicians. Ignoring campaigning costs and the probability of not being elected into
office increases the politicians’ earning and thus the PWG. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows that
the ÂTT varies between zero and 0.5 depending on the income definition and the sample used.
23 Another estimation technique to account for unobserved heterogeneity is the application of a
fixed-effects regression (see Diermeier et al. (2005) for an application to US Congress members).
However, this would require a panel dataset of MPs, and we have only data for one legislative
period. Moreover, there is no variation in the politicians’ dummy for MPs.
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are with respect to an unobserved confounder. A value of Γ = 1.6 would imply
that an unobserved confounder with an explanatory power of at least 1.6 times the
explanatory power of all observables X is needed to render the estimated effect sta-
tistically insignificant (at the 1% significance level). Thus, a low value of Γ indicates
that results are quite sensitive to unobserved confounders; high values of Γ (greater
than 2) suggest that it is highly unlikely that confounding factors alter inference.
The Γ values of Table 7 show that it is quite unlikely that personality traits of
politicians could render the positive PWG found in specifications (1) and (2) for full
earnings insignificant. The positive wage gap based on basic office remuneration for
the “all executive” sample is quite robust to omitted variable bias.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we test whether there is a wage gap for German MPs. Building on a
unique dataset and relying on the citizen candidate framework, we calculate the ex-
pected earnings of MPs taking into account election probabilities and campaigning
expenses. We estimate the politicians’ wage gap by comparing the MPs to a repre-
sentative sample of German executives using both OLS and matching techniques.
We find that both the sign and the size of wage gap depend on the definition
of the control group and the MPs’ income. Using the broadest sample of executives,
the PWG varies between 35–65% depending on the estimation method (correspond-
ing to 20,000–36,000 euros per year). Robustness checks suggest that these baseline
results are unlikely to suffer from omitted variable bias due to positive selection into
politics. When defining the control group more narrowly, the wage gap shrinks and
is statistically indistinguishable from zero for “top-level” executives. In this case, the
data suggest that the pay of politicians is not excessive. However, while MPs may
compare themselves with top-managers, this association might not be shared by the
public, which in turn might have consequences for the perception of the adequacy of
politicians’ pay. The wage gap also mechanically decreases when we exclude politi-
cians’ outside earnings and restrict their income to the basic office remuneration.
On the contrary, the income premium increases considerably when estimating the
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conditional wage gap, i.e. neglecting election probabilities and campaigning costs.
Thus, our empirical results are well in line with the theoretical predictions
of the citizen candidate framework, which stipulates a non-negative wage gap for
politicians. From a normative perspective, a positive PWG could be beneficial for
society if it attracted more able individuals to run for office and as a consequence
yielded a more efficient provision of public goods. Yet, recent theoretical and empir-
ical studies show that higher earnings need not necessarily lead to better politicians
(Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007; Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011). We contribute to
this result by showing that becoming a politician is financially attractive for the
average executive (and even more so for the average citizen) but not for top-level
managers and business-owners.
Several qualifications have to be made with respect to the magnitude of our
empirical results. First, in general, higher pay can be justified by a higher work-
load. Unfortunately, we do not observe the politicians’ working hours.24 Second, we
probably underestimate the PWG as we assume a conservative upper bound of out-
side earnings and overestimate individual campaigning costs. Third, it is likely that
there is positive selection into the profession of a politician. Although we show that
the baseline estimates are robust with respect to an unobserved confounder, their
exact magnitudes might change. Finally, we only compare politicians and citizens
at one particular point in time. However, politicians who follow political careers (as
opposed to career politicians, Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) might leave public office
in order to work in the private sector and benefit from their political network. It
would therefore be worthwhile to estimate the PWG using lifetime income (see e.g.
Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009; Querubin and Snyder, 2009). Moreover, our findings
for Germany should be complemented with (comparative) studies on other countries
and different institutional details and regulations to complete the picture.
24 There is evidence collected from the MPs’ websites that their working time lies between 50
and 70 hours a week. We find similar values for the executive samples.
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Figure A.1: Election probabilities: Electoral districts
Figure A.2: Election probabilities: Party lists
Note: The “relative position on party list” is the rank on the respective party list (with rank 1
being the most promising) divided by the total number of candidates on that list. Hence, the first
candidate on the list is assigned a value close to zero while the last candidate receives a one.
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Table A.2: Conditional wage gap: OLS and Matching
Executive sample All White collar Top-level
MP income Total Remun. only Total Remun. only Total Remun. only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 0.667∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.216 0.042
Matching 0.498∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ -0.101 -0.275
Observations 2104 2104 1584 1584 898 898
Note: Estimates derived from same specifications as in baseline models (see Tables 4 and
7). Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table A.3: Propensity score estimation
Executive sample All White collar Top-level
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Age -0.004 35.804 0.072 36.050 0.019 0.006
High-skilled -4.983 0.000 5.975 . 0.825 1.309
Medium-skilled -7.671 0.540 4.011 0.600 -0.065 1.307
Children -5.721 0.568 -6.251 0.626 0.268 0.254
Female 0.575 0.537 0.292 0.573 0.677 0.153
East 0.674 0.583 1.079 0.662 0.184 0.155
Married 2.040 0.559 0.251 . -0.686 0.158
Public sector 0.070 0.559 10.870 0.198 2.553 0.407
Self-employed -12.700 0.000 -2.378 0.727 -0.598 0.208
Age x H-skill -0.004 35.804 -0.069 36.050
Age x M-skill 0.029 35.804 -0.046 36.050
Age x Children 0.138 0.011 0.144 0.012
Age x Female 0.001 0.011 0.005 0.011
Age x East -0.011 0.012 -0.017 0.013
Age x Married -0.059 0.011 -0.060 0.012
Age x Public sector 0.023 0.011
Age x Self-empl. 0.018 0.013 0.007 0.013
H-skill x Children -0.404 0.246 -0.390 0.269
H-skill x Female -0.273 0.248 -0.169 0.265
H-skill x East 0.074 0.252 -0.072 0.291
H-skill x Married 0.306 0.262 2.118 0.589
H-skill x Public sector -1.355 0.248 -11.073 0.000 -0.718 0.420
H-skill x Self-empl. 10.059 0.620 0.558 0.332
M-skill x Self-empl. 9.873 0.670
Children x Female 0.493 0.211 0.416 0.223
Children x Public sector 0.168 0.213 0.152 0.218
Children x Self-empl. -0.061 0.265 -0.083 0.281 0.128 0.296
Female x East -0.141 0.216 -0.093 0.239
Female x Married -0.096 0.220 -0.268 0.231
Female x Public sector -0.144 0.199 -0.759 0.367
East x Married 0.163 0.221 -0.001 0.258
East x Public sector -0.133 0.207 -0.157 0.249
Married x Public sector -0.164 0.245 -0.119 0.243
Married x Self-empl. 0.193 0.283 0.179 0.302
M-skill x Married 1.947 0.610
M-skill x Public sector -9.735 0.274
Children x East 0.320 0.231
Children x Married 0.193 0.265 0.541 0.284
Female x Self-empl.. 0.258 0.242
East x Self-empl. -0.032 0.294
M-skill x East 0.202 0.329
Constant 5.594 0.481 -5.844 0.442 -1.495 1.332
Pseudo R2 0.490 0.437 0.375
χ2 1231 918 428
Observations 2104 1584 898
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